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Dialectical approaches, variously interpreted, have been advocated for by geographers for 
several decades. At the same time, critical environmental geography has recently become 
dominated by vital materialist strands of thought, the advocates of which have sometimes 
framed their own work in opposition to dialectics. Critics perceive two major problems with a 
dialectical framework; that it cements a nature-society dualism and that it insufficiently 
accounts for the agency or vitality of non-human life. This paper seeks to address these 
criticisms by engaging with work by biologists who have been influenced by dialectical 
ideas. I outline two examples, Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins’ understanding of the 
way organism and environment mutually construct each other and research by Ivette Perfecto 
and John Vandermeer that offers a non-dualist approach to wildlife conservation in 
agricultural ecosystems. The article discusses some of the ways in which these 
understandings might inform contemporary debates in political ecology. 
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In a 2015 paper in Antipode, Shannon Brincat and Damian Gerber (2015) make the case for a 
dialectical approach to contemporary environmental geography. For Brincat and Gerber this 
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is not just desirable but necessary: “it is only in moving toward a dialectical account of the 
totality…that we can begin to grapple with the accelerating ecological crises of the present” 
(2015:873). For these authors, nature should no longer be seen as external to human history; 
capitalism and its crises are inherently ecological. And, they argue, seeing “society in nature” 
as a totality or dynamic whole is a key aspect of dialectical thought. This stress on the 
dynamism of socio-natural systems is central to their argument. Dialectical thinking, they say, 
will enable us to grasp the potential for change inherent in the present; multiple and pervasive 
ecological crises will “shatter the illusion of the permanency of the capitalist world order” 
(Brincat and Gerber 2015:890). 
 Brincat and Gerber are not the only theorists who have referred to their work as 
dialectical. According to Castree (1996) dialectics, variously interpreted, has proved 
appealing to geographers since the late 1970s and continues to be discussed and debated. For 
example, Andy Merrifield (1993) has developed a dialectical approach within urban theory. 
Similarly, Edward Soja (1980) referred to his understanding of the way societies and spaces 
are mutually constitutive as a “socio-spatial dialectic”. Tyner and Inwood (2014) attempt to 
develop a dialectics of violence and a special issue on dialectics of Environment and 
Planning A featured various contributions from geographers (Dixon et al. 2008). 
 However, this article will draw on the ideas of a different group of dialectical thinkers, 
a small group of self-identifying dialectical biologists. Although the work of these biologists 
has sometimes been mentioned by social scientists, it has been underutilised within critical 
environmental geography, a field that has recently come to be dominated by a range of 
approaches collectively referred to here as new materialism or vital materialism. Bruce Braun 
(2015:1-2) describes this “diverse and increasingly well known” body of literature and notes 
its non-dualistic approach and emphasis on the inventiveness, vitality and indeterminacy of 
natural processes. This article argues that the debate between those adhering to dialectical and 
vital materialist approaches respectively has been framed by false antitheses. It aims to add 
clarity to these debates by highlighting a tradition of dialectical thought concerned with 
complexity, dynamism and agency, concerns that are also associated with new materialist 
thought. This calls into question some of the criticisms levelled at dialectics, specifically that 
it insufficiently accounts for the agency or vitality of non-human life. 
 The following sections will discuss some of the ways in which dialectics has been 
understood within geography before examining the debates between its advocates and those 
adhering to vital materialist approaches. The article then goes on to assess the theoretical 
contribution made by the dialectical biologists within their own discipline. This research is 
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based on interviews I carried out with several of these biologists as well as engagements with 
their written work. 
 
Why Dialectics? 
For Bertell Ollman, dialectics is “a way of thinking about the relations and processes in the 
world, and a method for studying them” (2014:573). Dialectics involves viewing reality as 
consisting of multiple processes that undergo continual change and are constantly relating to 
each other. It therefore defies the common sense view that reality consists of separate things 
that are more or less discrete. Ollman argues that Marx employed a dialectical mode of 
thought in order to understand capitalism and that dialectics continues to be one of the 
distinctive contributions of Marxist theory. Marx’s collaborator Friedrich Engels seems to 
have been sympathetic to this interpretation of dialectics, stating that: “The world is not to be 
comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which 
the things…go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away” 
(1947:52). One of the major distinguishing features of this interpretation is that it is a 
philosophy of internal relations as opposed to one of external relations. The latter “holds that 
reality consists of things…with boundaries that are distinct and relatively stable, which can 
undergo changes and get into relations” (Ollman 2014:574). In contrast, for Ollman reality is 
rather seen as fundamentally constituted by relations; a thing would not be what it is without 
the relations in which it exists. Ollman points out that various thinkers from Heraclitus to 
Hegel have favoured similar philosophies. Importantly, for Ollman his approach is 
simultaneously an ontology and an epistemology, a statement about the nature of reality as 
well as about how we might understand that reality. Ontology and epistemology are 
themselves internally related; ways of understanding the world must also relate to the way the 
world is (Ollman 2014:574). 
 One of the best known endorsements for such an approach within geography comes 
from David Harvey (1996) in Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference. Harvey 
defines dialectics in opposition to Cartesian reductionism. Whereas a Cartesian thinker might 
assume that reality can be understood by breaking it down into its constituent elements (each 
with its own independent properties) and studying each in isolation, a dialectician starts from 
the premise that the parts of any system cannot be understood without taking account of the 
whole within which they operate. Critics might argue here that it is impossible for a thinker to 
grasp the whole of reality at once; that it is therefore necessary to understand the world as 
composed of bounded entities to prevent “the study of anything spilling over into everything” 
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(Ollman 2014:574). Ollman counters this by saying that Marx employed a process of 
abstraction, bringing one aspect of a complex system into view momentarily in order to focus 
on it from a particular vantage point. But this does not imply treating that particular aspect as 
operating distinctly from other aspects of a totality (Ollman 2003, 2014). 
 Things, as they are constituted by relations, exist “in a state of ongoing 
becoming…never the same thing at any time” (Robbins 2012:94). Therefore, dialectics 
allows the thinker to grasp something about a world that is constantly in motion (Ollman 
2003), it places the emphasis on processes and flows rather than form and fixity allowing for 
an understanding of the processes driving change, why things that might appear solid and 
fixed come into being, as well as what forces pull them apart. Such an approach sees 
dynamism as an inherent property of things rather than external to them and, as a 
methodology, it treats dynamism as central to analysis rather than peripheral to it. 
 Related to this focus on dynamism, dialectics differs from some other approaches in 
that it is unapologetically political. Marx’s project for much of his life was to use such a 
methodology to analyse the capitalist system. Marx didn’t merely understand the system as it 
existed in his time, he set out to understand the processes by which it had come about and the 
direction in which it was heading (Ollman 2014). In one of his few accounts of his 
methodology, in the afterword to the second German edition of Capital, Marx (1976:103) 
stated that the dialectical method “regards every historically developed social form as in fluid 
movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary 
existence…and is in its essence critical and revolutionary”. This sentiment is evident in 
Brincat and Gerber’s (2015) references to illusions in the permanency of the capitalist 
system. They agree that dialectics allows its adherents to critique specifically capitalist socio-
natural relations, rather than naturalising them: such approaches treat the current state of 
things as always open to change, and seek out the potential for such change within the 
conditions of the present. 
 Brincat and Gerber are concerned in their article to apply a dialectical understanding 
to questions of “nature” and the environment. The following section this article will briefly 
recount some of the uses of dialectics in environmental debates before addressing the 
challenge posed to it by new/vital materialist approaches. It is by now well known that Marx 
and Engels took an interest in the natural sciences and, it seems, saw their approach as 
relevant to understanding the “natural” world as well as relations between humans (Foster 
2000). Likewise, in their writings on dialectics Ollman and Harvey both make little attempt to 
distinguish between “nature” and “society”. When the things of the world are dissolved into 
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the results of an ever-shifting ensemble of multiple processes it makes little sense to attempt 
to separate those things that are “social” from those that are “natural”. But, as Brincat and 
Gerber (2015:872-875) see it, Marxism in the 20th century had lacked an appreciation of 
(what they call) the “affinity” between humanity and nature; for them nature needs to be 
reintegrated into dialectics in order to recover a more naturalistic Marxism. 
 Brincat and Gerber see dialectics as offering a way round dualistic approaches to 
environmental politics; in other words those that rely on a conceptual division of society and 
nature. Readers of Antipode will no doubt be familiar with such critiques of nature-society 
dualisms. One of the major reasons why dualist approaches are seen as politically 
problematic is that they tend to treat human society as impacting on nature rather than acting 
as a part of nature with the logical corollary that humanity must collectively scale back its 
impact. Such an approach avoids entirely the discussion of the historically specific ways in 
which nature is produced–or in whose interests it is produced–that its critics say is needed 
(Loftus 2012:xxii). It therefore also precludes discussion of the wide-ranging societal changes 
needed to address today’s environmental problems. Philosophical dualism has also been 
linked to the association of nature with wilderness, erasing the history of human habitation of 
so-called “wilderness” areas and at the same time treating urban areas as unnatural and as 
beyond the remit of environmental social movements (Cronon 1995). Jason Moore (2015:2-
6) sees the notion of nature as external to human society as an ideological inheritance from 
the origins of capitalism. For Moore, dualism as an ideology makes natures more 
commensurable to capitalist appropriation, and the philosophical separation of humanity and 
nature in Western thought also underlines other dualisms including orientalism and binary 
understandings of gender relations. Furthermore, as Neil Smith (2008) pointed out, the view 
that nature is external to human society goes hand in hand with the assumption that nature is 
itself fixed or static. As we shall see such a position is at odds with biological reality. 
Understanding biological systems as existing in a state of flux has been central to dialectical 
biology, as has the project of accounting for processes that, rather than being “social” or 
“natural” are fundamentally socio-natural. 
 Several authors have attempted non-dualist dialectical interpretations of 
environmental issues. For example, Alex Loftus (2012) takes “inspiration from Marx’s 
dialectical approach to understanding the world” for his project of rethinking environmental 
politics. As Loftus argues, an approach drawing on Marxist dialectics can provide a 
framework “that is flexible enough to capture the interaction of what are normally conceived 
as separate elements: the natural and the social, the historical and the geographical” (Loftus 
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2012:xvii). Rather than being premised on a dialectical interaction between two separate 
elements–such as nature and society–such an approach calls into question the historical 
processes through which these elements came to be seen as separate. 
 Moore (2015:46), in Capitalism in the Web of Life, likewise employs what he 
describes as a dialectical approach and refers to dialectical biology, mentioning Richard 
Levins and Richard Lewontin (1985) and their book The Dialectical Biologist although he 
doesn’t discuss their contribution to biology in detail. For Moore (2015), a dialectical 
methodology is necessary to understand the ways in which capitalism’s historical 
development has taken place through nature rather than in opposition to it.i Harvey (1996) 
also draws on Levins and Lewontin’s work in setting out his own explanation of dialectical 
methodology, and Ted Benton (1991) refers to Lewontin while calling for further engagement 
on the part of sociologists with non-reductionist biology. 
 In a series of recent interventions John Bellamy Foster has asserted the importance of 
a dialectics of nature–a theory of dynamics, complexity and transformation–to his classical 
Marxist approach. For Foster, nature and society form a dynamic but differentiated whole, 
with the relationship between the two mediated by human labour. Foster differentiates his 
approach from both Ollman and Moore, referring to external relations between human 
societies and their natural environments as well as internal relations (Foster and Clark 2016; 
see also Foster 2016). 
 Foster’s colleagues Brett Clark and Richard York (2005a) have similarly used the 
word “dialectical” to refer to the way a human society relates to its external environment. 
Intriguingly they see this relationship as analogous to biologist Lewontin’s ideas about how 
living organisms relate to their own immediate environments which will be further discussed 
below. For Clark and York, dialectical thinking has implications for environmental problems 
more generally in that it avoids both mechanistic or idealist understandings. The former, they 
argue, treats nature as if it is like a machine, with deterministic properties. This is readily 
commensurable with capitalist production, for example by valuing nature as ecosystem 
services, as it implies that any problem can be overcome by human manipulation with 
predictable and measurable effects. Idealism, by contrast, assumes that nature existed in a 
state of balance or harmony before industrialized human societies interfered with it. This 
approach fails to take a materialist approach to human societies, treating them simply as an 
external threat to an otherwise stable natural world (Clark and York 2005b). These 
approaches are very different, but both are ahistorical. Both tend towards seeing “nature” as 
external to human society, whether as a source of inputs or as a balanced and harmonious 
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realm that humans disrupt. In contrast, Clark and York suggest that dialectical thinking is 
necessary to take into account the ways in which human societies have developed in relation 
to a changing natural environment (Clark and York 2005b). 
 In Lawn People, Paul Robbins (2007) adopts some of the same concerns as Clark and 
York. Although Robbins does not use the word “dialectical” in this work he points out how 
grassy environments have evolved alongside human civilisations throughout history with 
humans spreading grass species around North America. As well as lawns being cultivated by 
people, the needs of lawns continues to produce turfgrass subjects of the people who manage 
them. Far from being simply an expression of culture, the lawn itself plays an active role in 
the relationship between lawn and owner. Robbins later referred to dialectics as a key (if 
unacknowledged) methodological influence within political ecology by including a section on 
“human-non-human dialectics” in his critical introduction to the sub-discipline (Robbins 
2012). To conclude, dialectics offers an ontology that appears to avoid problematic society-
nature dualisms, is fundamentally relational, seeks to understand a totality but employs a 
method (abstraction) for dealing with particular aspects of that totality in turn, and has at its 
core the idea that socio-natural relations can be changed. 
 
New/Vital Materialisms 
However, while dialectics continues to be debated among environmental thinkers, 
particularly those influenced by Marxism, new materialist ideas have grown in popularity, 
including in geography (Braun 2015). The term “new materialist” covers a range of 
sometimes divergent theories. However, both Braun and Diana Coole (2013) say that this set 
of approaches have several characteristics in common making it possible to lump them 
together. 
 Firstly, new materialism represents a renewed engagement with the material 
properties of things themselves and often on matter’s supposed vitality, creativity and 
capacity to surprise: “matter is alive with the creative potential of endless evolutions and 
innovations” (Kearnes 2006:67). For example, in Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett (2009:58-60) 
reflects on the properties of metals, describing their crystalline structure and suggesting that 
these have a capacity to transform themselves as cracks spread through their structure as well 
as being able to be transformed by human agency. Traditional forms of vitalism have 
proposed the existence of a vital force (“elan vital”) that animates matter otherwise 
considered inert. By contrast, both Bennett and Elizabeth Grosz (2011:34), in Becoming 
Undone, make clear that they see liveliness as emerging and developing from matter rather 
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than encountering it as an external force: “life is not suffused of a special substance, soul, 
mind, or consciousness that separates it from materiality. It is the vital indeterminacy of the 
material world that enables life and that life exploits for its own self-elaboration”. 
 Secondly, new materialism develops an ontology of becoming or a process-based 
ontology. Thus, new materialists have turned their attention to the processes that constitute 
things, proposing that everything is in a continual process of becoming: “socio-ecological 
systems” have a “never exhausted potential to assume other forms” (Braun 2015:3). 
 Thirdly, new materialist accounts have expanded the scope of what counts as 
“agency”, often seeing non-humans as political ecological actors. Such work is a decisive 
shift away from anthropocentrism: approaches that see humans alone as possessing agency or 
that make rational human action the yard-stick against which an entity’s capacity to exhibit 
agency is measured. For example William Connolly (2013) opposes seeing human 
subjectivity as the “fundamental ground of things”. For Jamie Lorimer (2007), vital 
materialist thinking is influenced by the understanding of agency developed under the banner 
of actor-network theory. Actor-network theory (ANT), perhaps most closely associated with 
Bruno Latour (2005), is premised on the idea that entities, which might be human or non-
human, come together in networks to make things happen. Agency, rather than being a 
possession of a particular element in a network, arises as a result of the way these elements 
relate to each other (see also Castree 2002). 
 Finally, and related to the other three points, new materialist ontologies preclude 
seeing the world as fundamentally divisible into “social” and “natural” realms. They achieve 
this by allowing for non-human entities–both living and non-living–to be considered as actors 
and therefore endowed with some of the capacities conventionally reserved for humans 
and/or by drawing attention to the inhuman forces that constitute humans themselves. The 
fact that all humans have a microbiome, a community of microorganisms living on and inside 
us, is just one example of how entangled human lives are with those of non-human species 
(see Gilbert et al. 2012). This is often invoked to challenge individualistic assumptions about 
the human (see, for example, Connolly 2013). 
 New materialist accounts attempt to overcome some of the perceived inadequacies of 
earlier forms of thought. In particular, the proliferation of such approaches can be seen as a 
reaction to the dominance of accounts focussing on language, discourse and representation. A 




 But the rise of new materialisms can also be seen as a challenge to other materialisms, 
including Marxist dialectics. For some of its critics, dialectical thinking is unhelpfully 
predicated on the prior establishment of two distinct and opposing entities that come to relate 
to each other. In other words it is criticised for precisely the reliance on external relations that 
Ollman’s dialectics explicitly rejects. That critics can assume this is hardly surprising as 
dialectics is often defined as “the perpetual resolution of binary opposites” (see, for example, 
Derek Gregory’s [2009:157] entry in the Dictionary of Human Geography). This suggests a 
framework whereby a thesis encounters its opposing antithesis and the two are resolved to 
produce a new synthesis (which will then encounter a further antithesis ad infinitum). 
Therefore, such an approach can be seen to treat society and nature as two separate realms 
that come to relate in a reciprocal manner: society acts on nature and nature acts back. This 
has led Sarah Whatmore (1999:25) to dismiss dialectics as insufficient for grasping socio-
natural phenomena that are fundamentally hybrid as “far from challenging this a priori 
categorization of the things of the world, dialectics can be seen to raise its binary logic to the 
level of a contradiction and engine of history”. However, Noel Castree (2002:115), referring 
to Whatmore’s claim, says that her view is “not based on any in-depth analysis of Marxian 
theorisations of the nature-society interface”. Eric Sheppard (2008:2604), referring to 
Gregory’s definition of dialectics as a perpetual resolution of binary opposites, has argued 
that this interpretation does not reflect the way dialectics is generally utilised in practice. 
 It should be clear from the brief outline above that many of the tenets of the new 
materialism, particularly its emphasis on processes rather than fixity and its refusal to accept 
nature-society binaries, are similarly subscribed to by many dialectical thinkers, particularly 
those influenced by the philosophy of internal relations. As Kirsch and Mitchell (2004:689) 
put it: “One of the foundational moves of Marxist theory, like that of ANT, was a radical shift 
to a relational ontology, a world of relations and processes and not things-in-themselves”. 
Noel Castree (2002) has therefore argued that “false antitheses” have framed the encounter 
between environmental Marxism and alternative theories that call for a recognition of 
multiple forms of agency. ii While maintaining that ecological Marxism has made an 
important contribution to critiquing specifically capitalist environmental relations, he argues 
that it can be synthesised with theories that complicate environmental politics by 
acknowledging the role of multiple actors. 
 However, Kirsch and Mitchell (2004), while in agreement with much of Castree’s 
(2002) argument, caution that there are still substantial differences between Marxism and 
approaches such as ANT, despite efforts to reconcile them. In particular they say that ANT 
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would have us ignore problems of causality or the directedness of social relations. For 
example the overriding role of competition between capitals in shaping what happens in the 
workplace is downplayed in favour of an approach whereby social relations in the workplace 
are seen as the outcome of relationships between people, machines, commodities, and things 
(Kirsch and Mitchell 2004:700-701). This leaves ANT oddly “politically inert”, with some of 
its advocates even averse to making some of the normative judgements that are so central to 
dialectical thinking (Kirsch and Mitchell 2004:694-695). Likewise, Tyner and Inwood 
(2014:774) see dialectics, because is about processes rather than things, as going beyond 
surface appearances in order to get at “underlying” social relations. 
 There is still, as Loftus (2012:4) puts it, a “muted standoff” between those who 
advocate Marxist and new materialist approaches. Dialectics has also been criticised from a 
slightly different perspective–for its perceived tendency to foreground human agency at the 
expense of recognising the role of non-humans, and for giving insufficient attention to the 
materiality of non-human nature as well as that of the human body (Lorimer 2013). Lorimer, 
for whom dialectics lies “at the heart of Marxist geography” (2013:127), contends that a 
version of vital materialism is much more able to account for a diverse range of actors, for 
example in his own research into the way non-human charisma shapes the priorities of 
wildlife conservation (Lorimer 2015). Neil Smith’s (2008) production of nature thesis attracts 
particular criticism here. With its explicit focus on the role of human labour in producing 
natures, it is seen as tending to “minimize the influence of nature as a material force” (Boyd 
et al. 2001:557; see also  and Loftus 2012:13-16; Lorimer 2013). Lorimer intriguingly also 
suggests that Marxist thinkers have downplayed discussions of non-human agency due to a 
“residual Marxist antipathy...to discussions of the environment as a limit” (2013:127). 
 Recent work on lively commodities has tried to bridge the divide between emerging 
work on non-human agency and materiality and Marxian concepts of labour, value and 
commodification. For example, Maan Barua (2016) demonstrates how, in encounters between 
humans and large animals, for example between tourists and elephants, the physical features 
of the animals contributes towards what, following Donna Haraway (2008), he calls 
“encounter value”. The intention here is to move beyond the notion, common in political 
economy, that non-humans are a mere resource or a substrate on which human labour occurs 
towards seeing animals themselves as active participants in a process of capital accumulation. 
Boyd et al. (2001) have utilised Marx’s distinction between formal and real subsumption of 
labour, arguing that this distinction applies to the ways in which natural processes are 
incorporated into industrial production as well as to human labour. 
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 Of the two criticisms of dialectics discussed above, the first–that it relies on a binary 
logic–is not true of the dialectical approaches outlined so far. To the best of my knowledge, 
none of the advocates of dialectics cited above are referring to a relation between only two 
types of thing. The second–that it plays down non-human agency and materiality–poses more 
of a challenge to Marxist discussions of nature. However, I argue that far from rejecting 
issues of materiality and non-human agency, these are actually major concerns within one 
area of Marxist thought, the dialectical approach to biology. Therefore it is useful to engage 
with the way in which biologists have developed an understanding of dialectics within their 
own discipline in order to understand how their ideas might help rethink political ecology. 
 As Braun (2015:3) points out, works in the new materialist tradition often make use of 
concepts from the natural sciences, including biology. This is “not only justifiable but also 
necessary” for those who reject dualistic views of society and nature. But, for Braun, there is 
a persistent problem with scientism in some of the literature, including a tacit assumption that 
science “speaks in one voice” and the neglect of sharp theoretical differences within the 
natural sciences. Scientism, seeing scientific knowledge as neutral information on which 
social scientists can build their ideas, is unhelpful for a critical political ecology. Certainly the 
existence of a group of biologists who take their influence from Marx and Engels 
demonstrates Braun’s point that biologists are far from united in their ideological worldview. 
But, due to misunderstandings and sometimes hostility towards dialectical thought on the part 
of some within the new materialist tradition, the contribution of this group of biologists has 
yet to be fully explored. 
 In summary, new/vital materialist approaches have contributed much to discussions of 
non-human agency in environmental geography and sparked a welcome engagement with the 
natural sciences. However, critics have sometimes found these approaches politically inert. 
Conversely, while dialectics is more expressly political, its advocates have made relatively 
little attempt to engage with the natural sciences and a need to develop a more naturalistic 
dialectics has been identified. In the sections that follow, this article will attempt to speak to 
both sides of this debate by outlining two case studies of dialectical approaches to biology: 
the theory of niche construction and the approach to wildlife in agricultural ecosystems taken 
by a group of Marxist ecologists. 
 
Levins, Lewontin, and Niche Construction Theory 
Perhaps the best known of the small group of self-identifying dialectical biologists are 
Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin. Their 1985 book The Dialectical Biologist influenced 
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future generations of left-wing biologists in the US and worldwide. Levins and Lewontin 
have combined distinguished academic careers (both becoming professors at Harvard) with 
political activism. They were involved in Science for the People, an organisation that was 
active from the late 1960s until the 1980s and supported numerous causes including 
opposition to the Vietnam War, support for the Black Panther Party, women’s liberation, and 
research work with trade unions. The group published widely including in a bimonthly 
magazine–the organisation had established around ten chapters across the US by 1970 
(Moore 2013). 
 One of Levins’ and Lewontin’s key contributions to biology is their discussion of the 
relationship between organism and environment (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 2007; Lewontin 
1982); their ideas on this were a major influence on the theory of niche construction “the 
process of organism-driven environmental modification” (Odling-Smee et al. 2003), a theory 
that continues to gather enthusiastic advocates among biologists. For Lewontin, organisms 
play an active role in constructing their environments. Rather than simply encountering an 
environment, they “actively change and construct the world in which they live” (quoted in 
Odling-Smee et al. 2003). This process of making an environment involves the organism 
acting: 
 
They take bits and pieces of things that are out there already but to make them into an 
environment means to collect them together, to burrow in them, to chew them up, to 
do all kinds of things. (Interview, 16 April 2014) 
 
Lewontin thereby emphasizes what might be referred to as the agency of living things in 
changing the world around them, a view shared by Steven and Hilary Rose (2010), who note 
that “far from passively responding to a fixed environment, organisms…modify their 
environments”. 
 For some of the biologists I spoke to, the idea that organisms make their environments 
recalls Marx’s famous saying that people “make their own history, but they do not make it as 
they please”.iii Lewontin has also referred to the organism as the subject and object of 
evolution, echoing the view of Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukács (1971:19) that people are 
“simultaneously the subject and object of the socio-historical process”. But these ideas have 
now spread beyond the small group of biologists with an interest in Marxism. Many of those 
biologists working on niche construction would not use the term dialectical or claim to be 
influenced by Marx.iv Nevertheless, for Lewontin, widely thought of as an originator of the 
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idea, niche construction is “the best example I can think of of a dialectical approach to 
biology” (Interview, 16 April 2014). 
 Of course, those who point out that organisms construct their environments are 
making what seems an obvious point. It is well known that beavers change their immediate 
surroundings by building dams; birds, ants and various other animals build nests; plants 
change the composition of the soil (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Humans can also be thought of 
as niche constructors, modifying our own environments albeit on a vast scale. Indeed, 
changing the composition of the external environment, even by taking in nutrients and 
expelling waste products, is fundamental to what all living things do (Levins and Lewontin 
2007:33). If all these biologists were saying is that living things have an effect on the world 
around them they would be saying nothing new. However, for Levins and Lewontin an 
emphasis on the active role of organisms themselves has allowed them to question 
assumptions about what is meant by “environment” and also to challenge orthodoxies within 
evolutionary theory. 
 In ecology, the world in which organisms (be they humans, other animals, viruses, 
fungi, plants, etc.) live is referred to as their niche. However, the niche is not to be understood 
simply as a place–such as a rainforest, a rock pool, or the soil in a field–these are more 
properly called habitats. A niche, by contrast, is a set of conditions that an organism 
encounters that is relevant to that organism, it is “used to describe how, rather than just 
where, an organism lives” (Begon et al. 2006:31; Preston 2003:47-72). For example a 
humpback whale might only be able to tolerate temperatures within a certain range, salinity 
within a certain range, a certain minimum amount of food, etc. This way of thinking 
implicitly acknowledges that a niche does not exist without the organism that lives in it. If 
there was no such thing as a humpback whale, the habitat (the ocean) would still exist but it 
would make little sense to refer to the niche of such a creature. Nevertheless, biologists have 
sometimes argued as if the niche exists prior to the organism, understanding living things as 
existing within particular limits that circumscribe what is a suitable environment–the 
implication being that if something encounters conditions to which it cannot adapt it will not 
survive. For Lewontin, the assumption that a niche exists prior to an organism is erroneous. 
Rather, niches are both created and defined by organisms. 
 For Clark and York (2005a), niche construction theory implies that an organism exists 
in a relationship with an environment and similarly a human society can be thought of as in 
such a dialectical relationship. These authors do sometimes slip into binaries, referring to a 
“dialectical interchange between the environment and the organism” (Clark and York 
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2005b:328, emphasis added). However, they also stress that this is a dynamic relationship of 
mutual transformation rather than simple reciprocal interaction where organism impacts on 
environment and vice versa. 
 Levins and Lewontin have sometimes also spoken in terms of reciprocal relationships: 
“changes within the organism alter the external environment, which in effect then feeds back 
into the development and metabolism of the organism itself” (2007:83). However, elsewhere 
they have been more critical of any kind of a priori distinction between organism and niche. 
They have also applied to same logic to “society” and “nature”, refusing to delineate these 
prior to the relations that produce them. For example they have provocatively stated that “one 
cannot make a sensible environmental politics with the slogan ‘save the environment’ 
because, first, ‘the’ environment does not exist, and second, because every species, not only 
the human species, is at every moment constructing and destroying the world it inhabits” 
(Levins and Lewontin 2007:34). In saying that “the environment does not exist” they echo 
Alex Loftus’ (2012:xiv) statement that “there’s no such thing as nature” and seem to be in 
agreement with those social theorists who have questioned the adoption of “the environment” 
as an object of analysis. Indeed this aspect of Levins’ and Lewontin’s work has been referred 
to by Maria Kaika (2005:23) and Erik Swyngedouw (2014). Here Ollman’s distinction 
between external relations and internal relations is useful: Clark and York seem to be, at least 
in this case, referring to external relations, whereas the dialectical biologists seem also to 
adopt Ollman’s approach based on internal relations by questioning the very prior existence 
of “the environment”.v 
 Niche construction is seen by its advocates as a “neglected process” in evolutionary 
biology as well as being relevant in ecology (Odling-Smee et al. 2003).vi The ability of 
organisms to construct a niche has often been thought of as a consequence of evolution. So a 
species has evolved particular characteristics over many thousands of generations and, once 
acquired, those characteristics allow it to modify its environment. At the same time in 
Darwinian natural selection the arrow of causation goes in the other direction, from 
environment to organism. As Darwin observed, a population of organisms will tend to vary in 
their characteristics. Those with traits most suited to their environment will be more likely to 
survive and reproduce therefore passing on their genes to future generations (survival of the 
fittest really means survival of those most suited to the environment). 
 Levins and Lewontin (2007) note that modern evolutionary biology has therefore 
been founded on a strict separation of causal factors with those internal to the organism and 
those external to it treated as distinct. Two metaphors have become widely accepted and have 
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come to direct thinking in evolutionary biology. The “trial and error” model assumes that an 
organism’s niche poses problems that it must solve by evolution, while the analogy of 
“unfolding” common to developmental biology assumes that an organism will develop along 
a predetermined path under the influence of its genes (Lewontin 1982). Both metaphors, 
although they have proved useful in biology, are based on externalist logic. Both suggest that 
organisms passively respond to external forces, whether originating in their environment or in 
their own genes. Both see the organism as an object of evolution. For Levins and Lewontin, 
this neglects the organism’s role as an active subject in evolutionary processes (Levins and 
Lewontin 1985:87-89). This could represent a major force in evolution that had been 
somewhat overlooked in the past: “We weren’t following through and thinking about how 
that change in the environment then fed back to influence selection…So we tended to think 
of things in what you might think of as a unidirectional causal way” (Kevin Laland, 
Interview, 17 December 2015). 
 The example of the earthworm is often used to demonstrate how niche construction 
influences evolutionary processes. Worms construct their environment by their digging 
behaviour, aerating the soil, mixing it with organic matter and facilitating plant growth. 
Earthworms therefore live in and adapt to an environment that has been substantially altered 
by many generations of their ancestors (Laland et al. 2004). The niche constructing activities 
of worms have meant that, as a species, they have exposed themselves to an environment that 
they have themselves created and this has in turn influenced worm physiology. For example, 
due to the moist environment they help to create, worms have maintained some of the 
characteristics of their aquatic relatives. Worms haven’t just adapted themselves to life on 
land; they have adapted their environment to suit their physiology (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). 
Niche construction theorists argue that the presence of worms–essentially aquatic animals–on 
land cannot be adequately explained by standard evolutionary theory. They could not survive 
in their environment without making substantial changes to it (Odling-Smee et al. 2003:374-
376). 
 It should be noted here that niche construction doesn’t make the theory of natural 
selection redundant. It might actually reinforce the theory of natural selection by 
demonstrating how an organism creates a niche but is simultaneously also an object of what it 
has created. In standard evolutionary theory organisms are presumed to be well suited to their 
niche due to natural selection. In niche construction theory a “dynamic interaction” between 
niche construction and natural selection produces this organism-environment match (Odling-
Smee et al. 2013). 
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 It could be argued that real biological systems are too complex and involve too many 
actors to be adequately accounted for by referring to organisms and environments. Why 
reduce analysis to the interactions of two types when ecological systems involve multiple 
interacting humans, animals, plants, microbes, technologies and geological processes? Levins 
and Lewontin themselves are well aware of this problem. However, like other scientists, they 
find it impossible not to work with models that describe only particular aspects of a wider 
system. They differ from mainstream biologists in that they invoke Marx’s (and Ollman’s) 
method of abstraction, a way of momentarily bringing one dynamic into view in order to 
examine it while recognizing that “the truth is the whole” (Levins and Lewontin 2007:186). It 
is also contended that organism and environment themselves are so entwined that it is no 
longer justifiable to use organism and environment as points of reference. For example, 
Gilbert et al. (2012) say that, once the role of the microbiome is acknowledged, animals can 
no longer be thought of as individuals, a point that has been seized on by some new 
materialist thinkers. Here, it seems that Levins and Lewontin, if we interpret their work as 
being built on a philosophy of internal relations, would have little problem with the idea that 
organism and environment are entwined. For example they also recognize that organisms are 
effectively “environments” for the other organisms that live on or in them, so what is as an 
“environment” is defined relationally rather than just there. 
 In conclusion, the theory of niche construction is predicated on an understanding of 
the ability of living things (of all species) to act on and change the world around them. It is 
grounded in an understanding of evolutionary biology that integrates processes internal to the 
organism and external to it, processes which had once been held to be distinct. It is an attempt 
to overcome some of the ontological dualisms that have become common in biology. 
 
Novel Ecosystems, Dynamic Interactions 
Biologists have drawn attention to the ways in which the activities of different organisms 
don’t just change the environment of the species in question but also change the 
environments that other organisms are exposed to. As the human species constructs a 
particularly complex niche then this is perhaps most clear in the case of humans. As 
environmental geographer Ian Rotherham points out, human environmental modification has 
created the conditions for some other species to flourish. The warm waters of the River Don, 
once used for cooling in Sheffield’s steel plants, have created the conditions in which forests 
of figs have grown along the river’s banks. The seeds of these Mediterranean plants would 
not have been able to germinate were it not for human activity (Bramwell 2015). Extending 
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this insight, Erle Ellis (2015) uses the concept of niche construction in an extensive survey of 
the world’s anthropogenic biomes. This integrates ecological theory with ideas of 
anthropogenic change in a way that, Ellis argues, would not have been possible by assuming 
that humans simply adapt to their environment. For some, humans are “champion niche 
constructors”. However, this is not necessarily a case of human exceptionalism. Humans may 
be able to produce environments with more forethought than other species; but producing 
environments in general is something all living things do. In the fig tree example, the role of 
human action is highlighted but there are multiple categories of actor involved including the 
water and the fig plants. Nevertheless, there is a need to pay closer attention to what 
dialectical biologists have to say about human-influenced ecosystems, something to which I 
now turn by discussing the work of Ivette Perfecto and John Vandermeer. 
 Perfecto and Vandermeer are scientists and political activists who both specialise in 
the ecology of tropical agro-ecosystems. Both have worked with Levins and were also 
members of Science for the People. They have a normative preference for small-scale 
agriculture that uses few or no synthetic pesticides or fertilisers and an interest in shade-
grown coffee, i.e. coffee grown alongside tree species (Vandermeer and Perfecto 2012). This 
type of small-scale farming, adopting agro-ecological principles, is, they argue, best 
implemented by farmers themselves. Therefore supporting the aims of farmers and their 
organisations should play a fundamental role in biodiversity conservation in the tropics 
(Perfecto and Vandermeer 2008). Like Levins and Lewontin, Perfecto and Vandermeer have 
found it impossible and undesirable to disentangle their scholarship and their activism. 
 Ecologists like Perfecto and Vandermeer are increasingly interested in what happens 
in agricultural ecosystems–where human activity has played and continues to play a major 
role (see Gardner et al. 2009). Ecosystems such as these, characterised by novel combinations 
of species and arising as a result of human action are sometimes termed novel ecosystems 
(Hobbs et al. 2006).vii And adopting a novel ecosystem approach has led some ecologists to 
argue that they need to change the way they think. For example Gardner et al. (2009) suggest 
that ecologists should be more open to the idea that there are shifting baselines at work. They 
cannot expect that areas of forest are undisturbed environments that act as a baseline against 
which they can compare the effects of agriculture; the species composition in the forests is 
also undergoing change due to human activity. For Perfecto and Vandermeer (2008) 
conservation biology in the tropics has prioritised “charismatic” rainforest environments at 
the expense of looking at what happens in agricultural systems tending to reinforce the 
assumption that human activity is simply a threat to pristine environments. Perfecto’s and 
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Vandermeer’s work on tropical agro-ecosystems therefore adopts many of the concerns that 
have animated environmental geography in recent years. For example, they share Lorimer’s 
(2015) interest in wildlife in human-created novel ecosystems and in the way the interests of 
conservation biologists have been swayed by the appeal of charismatic species and 
environments. They are broadly in agreement with some of the critiques from geography of 
dualist approaches to environmental politics identified in this article. 
 Furthermore, Harvey’s and Ollman’s relational dialectical approach, with its focus on 
processes over things, is useful here. Rather than analysing what happens on, say, a small 
coffee plantation and treating it in isolation the latter is constituted by diverse processes 
occurring across multiple spatial scales. Climate change, geopolitical arrangements, trends in 
human coffee consumption, changes in individual farmer preference, national or regional 
agricultural policy and many other such processes that stretch beyond a specific locality all 
act to produce a particular type of ecosystem. Indeed, the inherently political implications of 
understanding ecosystems where human action plays such a major role is one of the reasons 
why Perfecto and Vandermeer have become interested in agriculture. As Perfecto explains: 
 
I like to look at this interaction between the humans and the natural system–the social 
system, the political system, and the natural system–and so if I work in a reserve, 
some place in the middle of nowhere, there is still some effect that the humans have 
on that area but it is not as evident…as it is in an agricultural system. (Interview, 22 
September 2014) 
 
However, this is not to say that Perfecto, Vandermeer and their colleagues neglect the role 
played by the many non-human species present in constituting such agro-ecosystems. These 
different species interact in complex ways. Ecological processes such as mutualism, 
parasitism, predation and competition are all evident (Vandermeer et al. 2010). Although 
many species are considered pests of coffee, some also provide autonomous pest control, 
reducing the need for farmers to apply synthetic pesticides (Vandermeer et al. 2010). But the 
presence of these species is inextricable from the growing of coffee for humans. Although 
agriculture (some types of agriculture more than others) is often, for good reasons, seen as 
having a negative effect on biodiversity, for Perfecto (2016) and colleagues: “agriculture 
provides an ideal arena to study biodiversity because it is an eminent driver of biodiversity 
loss, yet the services of species in forms of pest control, nutrient cycling, and pollination 
translate into benefits to productivity and sustainability”. 
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 Perfecto and Vandermeer’s work implicitly poses a challenge to the assumption that 
biodiversity is something that happens where agriculture is absent. They avoid conflating 
wildlife with wild spaces or wilderness, a dualistic way of dividing up space that geographers 
have also opposed (see Whatmore and Thorne 1998). They also touch on the question of what 
might be described as the agency of non-humans in these systems (although they would not 
necessarily adopt this term), Perfecto describes the research as “trying to understand what all 
this diversity is doing in the agro-ecosystem? What is the function of biodiversity?” 
(Interview, 22 September 2014). 
 
Conclusion 
For Ollman, dialectical thought grasps something about a reality that is constantly in motion. 
Likewise, dialectical biologists have also seen dynamism as central to their understanding. 
Levins and Lewontin maintain that they start from the position that the world is 
fundamentally dynamic: it is stasis that requires explanation; defining their own work in 
opposition to that of reductionist approaches to biology, they say that the dialectical thinker 
“regards constancy as the normal condition, to be proven otherwise” (Levins and Lewontin 
1985:277). In ecology this means recognising that ecosystems, as we observe them, are not in 
their final phase but that their composition continues to change over time.viii This dynamism 
is seen as resulting from the actions of the organisms transforming their environments rather 
than dynamism resulting from factors external to the system such as fires or floods (Preston 
2003:54). For Perfecto “organisms change their environment and then are changed by their 
environment–it’s a constant–things are constantly changing” (Interview, 22 September 2014). 
Inherent to this approach to biology, and to environmental thought, is the notion that socio-
natural systems are always open to change and transformation. 
 Brincat and Gerber (2015) make the case for the political importance of dialectics as 
an approach predicated on not accepting things as they are. But, they argue that a more 
naturalistic Marxism ought to be developed particularly in a context of urgent capitalist 
ecological crises. In the spirit of this appeal, this article addresses the naturalistic Marxism of 
a small group of biologists. I argue that their work offers a sophisticated understanding of the 
way living things construct their environments and the role of multiple actors in ecosystems. 
 The dialectical biology referred to here is also an inherently normative approach. 
Therefore dialectical thinking can also address some of the problems Kirsch and Mitchell 
(2004) identify with actor-network theory, that it offers no clear political perspective. 
Furthermore, highlighting the work of biologists who are influenced by Marxism addresses 
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Braun’s (2015) point that geographers should avoid scientism–an assumption that science 
“speaks with one voice”. Many of the scientists in question have developed their approach 
while remaining aware that both their own practice as scientists and the systems they study 
cannot be understood without reference to the context in which they occur. Both the uses to 
which science is put and, importantly, the content of scientific knowledge, can be seen as 
expressing a particular ideology. 
 This way of thinking has challenged orthodoxies within biology and is highly 
pertinent to current debates among environmental geographers. Nevertheless, dialectics has 
been under-utilised and often met with outright rejection, especially when accused of 
introducing problematic binaries between what is social and what is natural and of seeing the 
production of nature as exclusively human, therefore downplaying the vitality and materiality 
of non-human actors. In this article I have aimed to add clarity to these ongoing debates, 
using examples from the biological sciences to show how, contra these criticisms, dialectical 
thinking can be interpreted in a relational way that sees the production of nature as a more-
than-human process. This confirms, as Sheppard (2008) argues, that there is a tradition of 
dialectical thought concerned with complexity, dynamism and agency, a set of concerns that 
new/vital materialisms also seek to address. The criticisms of dialectics put forward by some 
geographers are directed against other geographers rather than against biologists. So invoking 
biology doesn’t necessarily resolve these debates. However, an examination of how dialectics 
is used in biology demonstrates that it is not necessary for dialectics to neglect non-humans. 
Therefore, incorporating some of these insights into a Marxist political ecology could further 




I heard the sad news of Richard Levins’ death in January 2016 as I was writing this article. 
Levins’ work, both as an ecologist and a writer on the social role of science, continues to 
have a profound influence on many in the scientific community and beyond. I would also like 
to thank the scientists who agreed to be interviewed for this research and Alex Loftus, Rob 
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i
   Although Foster and Moore both refer to dialectics in their work they clearly have strong 
disagreements (Foster 2016). Space here doesn’t allow for more than an acknowledgement of this heated 
debate between Marxists but I intend to discuss it elsewhere. 
ii 
   Castree (2002) is referring in this case to ANT. There are distinctions to be made between ANT and 
more recent strands of vital materialism but the point that these theories are (sometimes falsely) seen as 
antithetical to Marxism still stands. 
iii 
   Thanks to Stuart Newman for this point. 
iv 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
   Lewontin is familiar with Ollman’s (2003) book Dance of the Dialectic and refers to it in a discussion 
of abstraction (Levins and Lewontin 2007:150). 
vi 
   Ecology is concerned with the way organisms relate to each other and to non-living aspects of their 
environment while evolutionary biology deals with how species have evolved over long time-scales. The two 
have sometimes been considered as distinct while niche construction claims to integrate the two. 
vii 
   Strictly speaking a novel ecosystem is established by humans but does not require continued human 
influence for its maintenance. The term is used more loosely here for systems where human activity continues 
to play a dominant role. 
viii 
   Thanks to Joop van Lenteren for this point. 
